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1.  Introduction 
Electoral accountability lies at the heart of our conception of democracy (Barro 1973; 
Mayhew 1974; Ashworth 2012), and elections are often viewed as a critical means for voters 
to express their (dis)content with the performance of their politicians (Mitchell 2000; Strøm 
et al. 2003; Besley 2006; Geys and Mause 2015). Although this by no means always takes 
place, elections can also provide the opportunity for voters to respond to (what they perceive 
as) dishonest politicians or instances of outright corruption. Voters in modern democracies 
indeed expect politicians to adhere to a certain model of integrity, and strongly prefer them to 
abstain from illicit, inappropriate or illegal activities during the execution of their mandate. 
For instance, public debates about politicians’ extra-parliamentary interests and earnings 
often involve heated discussions on the ethical aspects of such behaviour (Noel-Baker 1961; 
Hollingsworth 1991; Geys and Mause 2013). 
 
Empirical research into the underlying corruption–accountability relation generally indicates 
that electoral support for the incumbent significantly decreases in the aftermath of a political 
scandal. Ferraz and Finan (2008) exploit random audits in Brazilian municipalities to show 
that publicly exposed corrupt incumbents are punished at the next elections. Costas-Pérez et 
al. (2012) and Chong et al. (2015) likewise find that providing voters with information about 
the inappropriate use of public funds reduces support for the incumbent in, respectively, 
Spain and Mexico. In similar vein, a substantial academic literature illustrates that corruption 
scandals tend to have negative implications for tax collection efforts (Artés et al. 2015; 
Timmons and Garfias 2015), depress voters’ trust in politicians (Anderson and Tverdova 
2003; Chang and Chu 2006; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2014) and reduce voter turnout 
due to popular dissatisfaction with the political class (Peters and Welch 1980; Caillier 2010; 
Bauhr and Grimes 2013; see, however, Kostadinova 2009). 
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Previous research in this field predominantly concentrates on the electoral and broader social 
effects of politicians charged with specific illegal activities such as, for instance, 
embezzlement of public funds, corruption or accepting bribes. In this article, we take a 
broader perspective and are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to explicitly analyse the 
effects of politicians’ publicly exposed ties to criminal organizations. Although this is 
arguably a very specific form of corruption (Gambetta and Reuter 1995; Heywood 1997), it is 
highly economically and politically relevant. Criminal organizations are often equipped with 
substantial economic and military resources, and their detrimental economic effects have 
been extensively documented in a variety of contexts (Pinotti 2015). Recent studies 
furthermore illustrate that criminal organizations can also represent a serious threat to elected 
governments, and are likely to induce important distortions in the political selection process 
(Dal Bó et al. 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2013; Daniele 2015; Daniele and Geys 2015; De Feo 
and De Luca 2015). Investigating voters’ reactions to politicians’ publicly exposed ties to 
organized crime thus is critical to evaluate whether the democratic process in itself can be an 
effective tool in restraining the (political) influence of criminal organizations.  
 
Our empirical analysis employs data from southern Italian municipalities in the regions of 
Calabria, Campania and Sicily covering the period 1985-2013. We select these three regions 
because the mafia has traditionally been concentrated here, and the set of municipalities in 
our analysis thus becomes restricted to those that are sufficiently comparable in terms of the 
potential involvement of organized crime in local politics (Sberna 2011; Daniele and Geys 
2015). Our identification strategy then is based on a law created by the Italian national 
parliament in 1991 aimed at reducing the impact of organized crime on local politics (Law 
164/1991). Law 164/1991 states that the national government has the power to dissolve a 
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municipal council – and appoint a temporary technocratic government – whenever any 
evidence arises of direct or indirect ties between local politicians and organized crime. Since 
its introduction in 1991, several council dissolutions for presumed mafia infiltration have 
been enforced every single year. In total, 254 dissolutions have taken place over the period 
1991-2014. Importantly, the enforcement of this law within a given municipality at a specific 
point in time represents an exogenous shock to the local political establishment, since its 
occurrence and timing is fully determined at the national level. Furthermore, and crucially, it 
implies the public exposure of incontrovertible evidence of ties between local politicians and 
criminal organizations, which is likely to induce a sharp change in citizens’ perceptions of 
local politicians. Hence, variation over time and space in the application of this law provides 
a unique opportunity to test the electoral reactions to such mafia-related scandals using a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy.  
 
Comparing political outcomes in municipalities with and without the enforcement of Law 
164/1991 before and after its enforcement, we show that public exposure of politicians’ ties 
to organized crime causes a statistically significant drop in voter turnout during subsequent 
local elections. This is in line with previous studies showing a decrease in voter turnout 
following alternative cases of corruption (Caillier 2010; Bauhr and Grimes 2013), and 
indicates that voters express their dissatisfaction with the political class at least in part 
through increased abstention. Importantly, while we observe a similar drop in voter turnout in 
national elections taking place in the years immediately following local council dissolutions, 
this drop is much weaker (i.e. approximately 30% to 40% of the drop in local turnout). The 
difference in the strength of both effects strongly suggests that voters’ discontent is specific 
to local politicians, or, at least, that voters are able to largely target the expression of their 
discontent to the local political level. In line with such interpretation, we also find that the 
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enforcement of Law 164/1991 has a negative impact on the electoral performance of the 
incumbent party (which is most clearly implicated by the council’s dissolution) as well as 
purely local political parties (which we show are more likely to be in power when council 
dissolutions take place). Instead, voters appear to turn towards local chapters of national 
parties. This is particularly true for nationally active left-wing parties, which have 
traditionally been less affected by mafia infiltration (see Dickie 2005). 
 
Finally, we also find evidence of a significant decrease in local government’s ability to 
collect fiscal revenues in the period immediately following a council dissolution for 
presumed mafia infiltration. Voters thus appear to become less willing to pay local taxes or 
contribute to the financing of local public goods when they perceive local politicians as being 
delegitimized by mafia connections. This finding is consistent with the idea – well-known 
from social exchange theory (Blau 1964; Akerlof 1982) – that public exposure of politicians’ 
apparent ties to organized crime breaches their side of the (psychological) contract between 
politicians and voters (in which politicians should abstain from illicit, inappropriate or illegal 
activities), and voters’ subsequent ‘retaliation’ via their tax payments. 
 
Overall, our results indicate that voters use local politicians’ public exposure of ties to 
organized crime to evaluate their political environment. The resulting shift in voters’ political 
decisions is in line with theories of retrospective voting, which maintain that voters use 
elections to remove low-quality candidates from political power (Persson and Tabellini 2002; 
Besley 2006). More importantly, however, it also contributes to the expanding literature on 
the efficacy and influence of anti-corruption programs (Olken 2007), and particularly on the 
role of “information disclosure about corruption (…) [to] reduce capture of public resources” 
(Ferraz and Finan 2008: 706; Reinikka and Svensson 2005; Gentzkow et al. 2006). Our 
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findings indeed underline that the public availability of information about the results of anti-
corruption programs have the ability to reduce asymmetric information problems in the 
political process, which in turn allows voters to select better politicians (see also Ferraz and 
Finan 2008). 
 
2.  Institutional Framework 
2.1. Law 164/1991 
Following a period of intense mafia-related killings, the Italian government reinforced its 
legislation aimed at fighting organized crime in the early 1990s. A crucial innovation thereby 
was the introduction of Law 164/1991, which aims at breaking ties between organized crime 
and politicians in local institutions. The law particularly states that whenever direct or 
indirect links emerge between local elected politicians and criminal organizations, or when 
there are suggestions of undue pressures influencing or compromising the normal functioning 
of the local administration, the municipal council can be dissolved and replaced by a 
temporary technocratic caretaker government. Any proposal to dissolve a local government 
derives from a parliamentary commission (the ‘Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia’) 
within the Ministry of Interior, and must be approved by the President of the Republic and 
the government cabinet. The technocratic caretaker government consists of three 
commissioners nominated by the Ministry of Interior (generally high-level bureaucrats), who 
will govern the municipality for a period of 12 to 24 months. Subsequently, local elections 
will be organized, and a new municipal government can take charge. The inauguration of this 
new government naturally also brings about the discharge of the commissioners. 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the enforcement of Law 164/1991 over time. This clearly 
illustrates that dissolutions have taken place every single year since the introduction of the 
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new legal framework, which helps differentiating the effects of the law from those of time-
specific events in our analysis below. The substantial peak of dissolutions in the early 1990s 
links to a period of intense and escalating conflict between the mafia and Italian institutions 
(Dickie 2005), and indicates a high initial willingness to employ the new legal tool in the 
fight against organized crime. In more recent years, the number of dissolutions due to 
presumed mafia infiltration increased strongly again. This observation might be associated 
with a recent reinvigoration of the political will to fight organized crime as well as a re-
intensification of the political power of criminal organizations. The fact that several of the 
recent dissolutions have been implemented in municipalities in northern Italy – which had not 
occurred previously – gives some weight to the latter interpretation, since it suggests that 
criminal organizations are extending their (political) activities outside their ‘traditional’ 
strongholds. In this paper, we restrict the sample to municipalities in Calabria, Campania and 
Sicily, as most dissolutions have historically taken place in these three regions (see Figure 2), 
and the mafia has traditionally been concentrated here. 
_______________________ 
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
_______________________ 
From a methodological perspective, is it important to observe that the enforcement of Law 
164/1991 is fully determined at the national level, and its occurrence and timing therefore 
remains exogenous from the perspective of the local political establishment. Furthermore, 
even when (some) voters might have had suspicions about local politicians before the council 
dissolution, the dissolution itself arguably still constitutes an important shock because it 
provides incontrovertible evidence of ties between local politicians and criminal 
organizations. Given the specifics of the decision process, its timing is also unpredictable by 
the local population, such that the exact moment of the dissolution remains unexpected. This 
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allows us to exploit these dissolutions as the basis for our identification strategy when 
studying voters’ responses to politicians’ publicly exposed ties to criminal organizations (see 
below). We should also note in this respect that since 34 municipalities have seen their 
council dissolved twice (and seven municipalities even had a third dissolution), we restrict 
attention to the first dissolution that occurs in any given municipality. Later dissolutions are 
presumably less informative or unexpected, and thus are less likely to induce a sharp change 
in citizens’ perceptions of local politicians. 
 
2.2. Local political system  
Local government in Italy is organised along a parliamentary system, and consists of a 
legislative branch (Consiglio, or local council) and an executive branch (Giunta, or local 
government). Both local political institutions are headed by the mayor. During municipal 
elections, citizens directly elect the councillors (Consiglieri) and – since 1993 – the mayor 
(Sindaco). Importantly, not all 8000 Italian municipalities hold elections at the same time, but 
they do all operate on an electoral cycle of similar length (i.e. five years). Consequently, local 
elections are effectively quasi randomly distributed across municipalities in a five year cycle. 
After an election, the mayor is in charge of appointing a certain number of aldermen 
(Assessori) depending on the population size of the municipality. Municipal councils have 
important powers in terms of local taxes (particularly taxes on property) and the provision of 
public goods (for instance, culture and recreation, transport, economic development, 
education, waste management, local police and social welfare). 
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3.  Empirical analysis  
3.1. Estimation Strategy 
As indicated above, we use the exogenously imposed enforcement of Law 164/1991 to 
identify voters’ responses to the public exposure of politicians’ ties to organized crime. We 
particularly exploit the temporal and geographical variation in these shocks to local politics 
via a difference-in-differences approach comparing municipalities with/without the 
enforcement of Law 164/1991 before/after its enforcement. Using subscript i for 
municipalities and t for time, the baseline specification is: 
 
Yi,t = αi + 𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + β3Controlsi,t + εi,t   (1) 
 
Yi,t covers a set of political outcomes at the municipal level at time t, which can be expected 
to be dependent upon citizens’ perceptions of the integrity – or lack thereof – of the local 
political class. In close correspondence to previous work on the implications of political 
scandals (e.g., Peters and Welch 1980; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Kostadinova 2009; Caillier 
2010; Bauhr and Grimes 2013; Chong et al. 2015), we thereby analyse voter turnout rates as 
well as electoral support for the incumbent (or voters’ partisan preferences more generally). 
Given that these outcomes by definition are specific to elections, the time dimension of the 
analysis at this point includes only election years. In addition, we extend previous work by 
also analysing local governments’ ability to collect local fiscal revenues, which evaluates the 
extent to which any breach in trust in the local political principal-agent relationship translates 
into citizens’ lower willingness to contribute to the financing of local public goods (as 
predicted by social exchange theory; Blau 1964; Akerlof 1982; more details below). Since 
this information is available on a yearly basis, the analysis here includes all years. The exact 
operationalisation of these various dependent variables is provided in subsequent sections 
below. 
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Our main explanatory variable in equation (1) is AfterDissolutioni,t. It is operationalised as an 
indicator variable equal to one in municipalities dissolved for ties between local politicians 
and criminal organizations in the period after the dissolution (0 otherwise). To assess the 
temporal persistence of any observed effects, we thereby distinguish between the first 
election following the mafia-related council dissolution (i.e. First election after dissolution) 
and all subsequent elections after the dissolution in our sample (i.e. Later elections after 
dissolution). Throughout the analysis, we furthermore include a full set of municipality fixed 
effects (αi) as well as a full set of year fixed effects (Yeart). The former intend to capture any 
(un)observed heterogeneity across municipalities, while the latter account for time-specific 
elements common to all municipalities. Finally, in some specifications we also introduce 
province-year fixed effects, which accommodate for the potential influence of any type of 
time-varying changes at the provincial level (we have 19 provinces in our sample). Summary 
statistics are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
Clearly, as mentioned above, a central assumption underlying our empirical approach is that 
the dissolution of local council reveals new information to voters about their political 
principals (thus representing a novel signal about the quality of local government), and that 
this information is widely disseminated within the local population. The information-
dissemination assumption appears trivially acceptable since the dissolution of one’s 
municipal council is unlikely to go unnoticed among voters. The new-information assumption 
is more difficult to verify directly, but complete confirmation of citizens’ priors would not 
induce any significant effects in the analysis below. Furthermore, our use of municipality 
fixed effects (αi) (as well as province-year fixed effects in some models) captures citizens’ 
priors about local-level corruption. 
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3.2. Voter Turnout 
In Table 1, we estimate model (1) using voter turnout rates – measured as the total number of 
votes cast during an election as a percentage of the total eligible population in the 
municipality1 – as the dependent variable. In panel I of Table 1, we focus on voter turnout in 
municipal elections over the period 2000-2013, whereas panel II analyses turnout in national 
elections between 1987 and 2008. Since we unfortunately lack information on voter turnout 
in municipal elections prior to 2000, the time period and number of observations available for 
analysis in panel I is considerably lower than in panel II. In both panels, the results in 
columns (1), (3) and (5) focus on the immediate effect of politicians’ publicly exposed ties to 
criminal organizations in the first election after the dissolution, whereas columns (2), (4) and 
(6) also assess the presence of any longer-term effects across subsequent elections after the 
dissolution. In each case, several sets of results are provided. Columns (1) and (2) exclude 
province-year fixed effects, which are included in columns (3) to (6). Moreover, Columns (1) 
to (4) include all available observations, whereas columns (5) and (6) restrict the sample to 
municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced at some point in time. While the latter leads 
to a very restrictive sample particularly in panel I, it confines our inferences to the sample of 
municipalities where organised crime is most obviously politically active in the period under 
analysis – whether or not it has already been revealed. As such, it goes some way towards 
controlling for possible unobserved differences between municipalities with and without 
mafia infiltration, and arguably can provide an estimate of the mafia revelation effect 
distinctly from the mafia infiltration effect. 
                                                          
1 This operationalisation includes both valid, invalid and null votes. An alternative operationalisation using only 
valid votes as a percentage of the total eligible population in the municipality does not affect any of the 
inferences drawn below in terms of effect sizes and significance levels. Note also that we likewise 
experimented with the share of invalid and null votes (relative to all votes cast in the election) as the 
dependent variable. These auxiliary regressions consistently show small positive coefficient estimates, but 
these effects always remain statistically insignificant at conventional levels (full details upon request). 
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_______________________ 
Table 1 about here 
_______________________ 
The results in panel I of Table 1 show that publicly exposing local politicians’ ties to criminal 
organizations has an important effect on voter turnout in subsequent municipal elections. The 
coefficient estimates suggest that voters become statistically significantly less likely to 
participate in local elections, with an estimated effects size of 2.8 to 3.9 percent in the first 
election after the dissolution. Even in the very restrictive samples used in column (5) and (6), 
the estimated effects remain statistically significant and substantively meaningful. 
Interestingly, columns (2) and (4) indicate that the effect also appears to be quite persistent 
over time. While this observation cannot be confirmed in column (6), it should be observed 
that the number of observations for dissolved municipalities in later elections in this sample is 
very small, which substantially undermines the power of our test procedure in this instance. 
Overall, however, our findings are in line with previous studies indicating a decline in 
citizens’ interest in politics following corruption scandals (Chong et al., 2011; Stockemer, 
2013; Stockemer et al., 2013; Costas-Pérez, 2014).  
 
Panel II of table 1 shows that there is similar decline in voter turnout rates in national 
elections after the enforcement of law 164/1991. The coefficient estimates, however, are 
consistently substantially lower than in panel I (i.e. approximately 30% to 40% of the voter 
turnout drop in municipal elections).  This apparent concentration of the turnout decline in 
municipal elections strongly indicates that local political issues – such as local politicians’ 
publicly exposed ties to criminal organizations – are the predominant driving force behind the 
findings in panel I. Moreover, it provides some indication that alternative possible 
mechanisms based on, for instance, vote buying activities of criminal organizations (Dickie 
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2005; De Feo and De Luca 2015) are unlikely to explain our results. Indeed, if such 
mechanism were driving the results in panel I of Table 1, we should expect them to likewise 
exist in national elections – and thus observe a similar drop in turnout also in the results for 
national elections in panel II.  
 
3.3. Party choice 
Our findings thus far illustrate that voters react to politicians’ publicly exposed ties to 
criminal organizations by increased abstention on Election Day. This section takes the 
analysis one step further and turns to the potential effects of mafia-related corruption scandals 
on voters’ party choice. Previous research has highlighted an important negative effect of 
publicly exposed corruption on the incumbent’s – or incumbent party’s – vote share (e.g., 
Ferraz and Finan 2008; Chang et al. 2010; Costas-Perez et al. 2012; Chong et al. 2015). Table 
2 – which follows the same format as Table 1 – evaluates the presence of a similar effect in 
our setting. We therefore estimate equation (1) using an indicator variable equal to one if the 
incumbent party (i.e. the party in power at the time of the dissolution) is re-elected in post-
dissolution elections as the dependent variable. We expect 𝛽1<0. 
_______________________ 
Table 2 about here 
_______________________ 
The results in Table 2 are in line with our expectations, and suggest a statistically significant 
drop in incumbent’s probability of retaining control over the local council in post-dissolution 
elections. Across all specifications in Columns (1) to (4), the estimated effect size is also 
substantively meaningful, since the incumbent party’s probability of winning the elections 
after a mafia-corruption scandal declines with 11 to 17 percent. Columns (5) and (6), 
however, provide substantially weaker results in terms of effect size and statistical 
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significance. Although the power of the analysis here is reduced by the fact that the number 
of observations is only 10% of the sample in Columns (1) to (4), some caution is clearly 
required in assessing the impact of a mafia-corruption scandal on the local incumbent’s 
probability of re-election. 
 
Intuitively, negative effects on the incumbent party’s electoral appeal would seem obvious to 
arise, since this party is clearly most immediately implicated by the council dissolution. Table 
2 does not indicate, however, whether such effects would similarly arise with respect to the 
overall local party system. Table 3 therefore extends the analysis to all political parties active 
within a given municipality, and assesses more generally whether – and, if so, in which 
direction – voters’ political preferences shift following the public exposure of local 
politicians’ ties to organized crime. In this case, the dependent variable(s) when estimating 
equation (1) is a set of four indicator variables set to 1 if a specific political party wins the 
local elections. We thereby consider four groups of political parties: i.e. purely local parties 
(i.e. without clear affiliation to national parties), left-wing, right-wing and centrist parties. 
The results are summarized in Table 3. The top panel of Table 3 shows the results when 
concentrating on the first election following the council dissolution, whereas the bottom 
panel also includes any potential effects in later elections after the enforcement of Law 
164/1991. To preserve space, we only report the results when including province-year and 
municipality fixed effects, but the results are qualitatively unchanged considering different 
specifications (details upon request). 
_______________________ 
Table 3 about here 
_______________________ 
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The key findings in Table 3 suggest that purely local parties are significantly less likely to 
win local elections following the dissolution of the municipal council. Their probability of 
gaining control over the local council indeed declines with approximately 20 percent in the 
first post-dissolution election, and just under 15 percent in later post-dissolution elections. In 
contrast, left-wing parties become significantly more likely to win elections in the post-
scandal period: i.e. roughly 19 percent in the short term and almost 14 percent in the longer 
term. Right-wing parties also appear to become somewhat more likely to local elections, but 
this effect is only about half the size of that observed for left-wing parties. No effects are 
found for centrist parties. The substantial shift towards nationally active left-wing parties 
results may well be linked to voters’ perceptions about different parties’ politicians’ integrity. 
On the one hand, Dickie (2005) presents substantial anecdotal evidence suggesting that the 
Italian Communist party had been immune to mafia infiltration until its dissolution at the end 
of the 1980s. It is at least conceivable that the same observation persists to some degree also 
for current Italian left-wing parties. On the other hand, purely local parties might be more 
likely to be infiltrated by criminal organizations since, in stark contrast to the local divisions 
of national or regional parties, they are not accountable to any higher-level organization.  
 
To further substantiate this interpretation, we turn to an analysis of the probability that local 
councils are dissolved for suspected mafia infiltration in Table 4. The estimation model is 
given by (with subscript i for municipalities and t for time): 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛i,t = αi + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + β3Controlsi,t + εi,t   (2) 
 
The dependent variable 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛i,t is an indicator variable equal to one for municipalities 
where the local council is dissolved in the year before the enforcement of Law 164/1991. The 
key independent variables – captured by 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 – are a set of indicator variables equal to 1 
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if a given political party is in power in municipality i in year t. As before, we thereby 
consider four groups of political parties: i.e. purely local parties, left-wing, right-wing and 
centrist parties. As such, the model evaluates the probability that a certain political party 
controls the municipal council at the time of the enforcement of Law 164/1991 (i.e. at the 
time of the mafia-corruption scandal). Based on our discussion above, we would expect a 
higher (lower) probability of mafia-related dissolutions in municipalities governed by purely 
local (left-wing) political parties. 
_______________________ 
Table 4 about here 
_______________________ 
The results in Table 4 are broadly consistent with our expectations. That is, we observe that 
municipalities governed by purely local parties (which constitute the reference category in 
Table 4) are most likely to be dissolved for suspected mafia infiltration. The coefficient 
estimates for all other parties are indeed negative. Moreover, we observe the strongest effect 
– in terms of both statistical significance and estimated effect size – for left-wing political 
parties. These parties thus appear least likely to be dissolved for suspected mafia infiltration. 
Consequently, citizens’ observed shifts in party choice in the aftermath of a mafia-related 
council dissolution (see Table 3) can at least in part be rationalized by the fact that purely 
local parties are indeed most likely to be accused of having ties with the mafia.2 
 
Taken together, tables 2 to 4 again suggest a precisely ‘targeted’ voter response. That is, 
voters can seemingly target their retribution to politicians and parties directly linked to the 
                                                          
2 Purely local parties in our Italian setting are often focused on a limited number of very specific policy issues, 
or are built around local personalities. As such, these parties tend to be subject to frequent mergers, break ups 
or other changes in their composition or their name, and generally witness high turn-around across elections 
(for a similar observation in a different setting, see Vermeir and Heyndels 2006). Even so, however, voters 
may decide to turn away from purely local parties following a mafia-related political scandal because they lose 
trust in the category of ‘local parties’ more generally (rather than in a specific local party). 
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scandal rather than simply punish all politicians independent of their partisan affiliation (or 
their actual tie to the scandal). This finding is at odds with recent results by Chong et al. 
(2015) in Mexico, who show that increased knowledge about the incumbent’s level of 
corruption reduces both incumbent and challenger support in roughly equal measure. Voters 
in their setting appear to simply withdraw from the political process. One possible 
explanation for this difference might be that many challengers in their Mexican data had 
previous political experience at a level of government with “the most discredited jobs in 
Mexican politics” (Chong et al. 2015: 70). Hence, most challengers in their setting are likely 
to be known to voters and tend to have a tainted political past. This is not the case in our 
Italian dataset since “first-time politicians represent a very significant share of the overall 
population” (Daniele 2015; see also Daniele and Geys 2015). Voters in Italian municipalities 
thus are much less likely to be familiar with the incumbents’ challengers, which may be a 
reason to give them the benefit of the doubt. 
 
3.4. Local fiscal revenues 
Overall, our findings in Tables 1 to 4 corroborate the idea that politicians’ publicly exposed 
ties to criminal organizations have important electoral implications in subsequent years. This 
strongly suggests that voters witness a substantial decrease in trust in local politics following 
the exposure of mafia ties to local politicians (for similar observation on other types of 
political scandals, see Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang and Chu 2006; Solé-Ollé and 
Sorribas-Navarro 2014). In this section, we broaden the analysis beyond purely electoral 
outcomes and explore whether the public exposure of ties to organized crime also affects 
citizens’ willingness to pay for local public goods through local taxation. 
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It is well-known from social exchange theory that actors’ perceived obligations towards one 
another are dependent upon both an explicit and an implicit contract or agreement between 
them (Blau 1964; Akerlof 1982). The implicit (or psychological) contract thereby “entails a 
social exchange that is superimposed upon the strictly economic transaction [i.e. the explicit 
contract]” (Blau 1964: 94) and comes about “as a result of normative expectations and value 
orientations in collectives” (Blau 1964: 5). For instance, in a work environment the implicit 
contract between employers and employees may be such that employers “give trust, loyalty 
and recognition to workers, and workers give effort in return” (Barkema 1995: 22; see also 
Frey 1993a, b). In our setting, a likely manifestation of such a psychological contract between 
politicians and voters could consist of politicians’ abstention from illicit, inappropriate or 
illegal activities during their political mandate and voters’ regular payment of their taxes. The 
public exposure of politicians’ apparent ties to organized crime could in such framework be 
viewed as an important breach of politicians’ side of this implicit agreement. Since corruption 
perceptions are generally a strong determinant of tax compliance (Cummings et al. 2009; 
Torgler and Schneider 2009; Rothstein et al. 2012; Timmons and Garfias 2015), one might 
therefore expect that voters could ‘retaliate’ via their tax payments. The psychological 
contract between politicians and voters thus is likely to place important “demand-side 
constraints on tax collection” (Timmons and Garfias 2015: 13). 
 
To assess this, we estimate equation (1) with an indicator of local governments’ ability of 
revenue collection as the dependent variable. This indicator was recently employed also by 
Drago et al. (2014), and effectively measures the ratio between actually collected revenues 
within a municipality in a given year and the total amount of assessed revenues this 
municipality should have collected within that year. As such, it can be interpreted as a proxy 
for the local government’s ability to fight tax evasion (Drago et al. 2014). Local revenues are 
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of critical importance to Italian local governments since they constitute a main source of 
income in the municipal budget. For instance, local revenues on average corresponded to 
52% of the entire budget for Italian municipalities in 2009 (IFEL 2014). Consequently, 
Italian municipalities tend to be financially dependent on a strong ability of local revenue 
collection. Generally, such revenues derive partly from local taxes (e.g., on properties and 
waste disposal) and partly from retributions charged for locally provided public goods (e.g. 
kindergartens, local public transport, and museums).  
 
The results are summarized in Table 5. Note that we do not restrict the sample to electoral 
years in this analysis since we observe the evolution of the revenue indicator on a yearly 
basis. Furthermore, since the commissioners nominated by the national government might 
have had an impact on local government performance, we extend equation (1) with an 
addition indicator variable equal to one in the year(s) of the commissioners’ government (i.e. 
Under Law 164).  
_______________________ 
Table 5 about here 
_______________________ 
The results in Table 5 are indicative of a drop in the ability of revenue collection after a 
mafia-corruption scandal. Interestingly, the effect appears to arise almost immediately, since 
we observe negative point estimates already during the period of the commissioners’ 
government (though this generally remains statistically insignificant at conventional levels). 
The observed effects strengthen to approximately 3.5 percentage points when a new local 
government is appointed after the first round of post-dissolution elections, which is 
equivalent to about 20% of a standard deviation. Such findings are consistent with the idea 
that voters react to politicians’ breach of the psychological contract underlying the local 
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political principal-agent relationship via their tax payments.3 Nonetheless, columns 3 and 4 
clearly illustrate that the drop in revenue ability is not persistent over time, but rather 
improves again after later elections. Hence, the local political class appears to be able to 
redeem itself over time. This lack of persistence in corruption’s revenue effects over time is 
also observed in Timmons and Garfias’ (2015) study of revealed financial corruption and tax 
compliance in Brazilian municipalities.4 They suggest that continued information about 
corruption may be crucial to sustain a link between politicians’ integrity and tax compliance, 
which may also play some role in our setting. 
 
To more comprehensively assess the timing of the observed effects, Figure 3 depicts the 
results when using a more flexible functional form, which allows for more detailed temporal 
variation in the estimated effect of mafia infiltration. Specifically, rather than including only 
indicator variables for the first and later electoral periods following the mafia-related council 
dissolution (i.e. First election after dissolution, and Later elections after dissolution), we 
include a set of time-specific dummy variables (D+x) that take value one only for 
municipalities put under commissioners in the years x and x+1 subsequent to the dissolution 
of the government due to (presumed) mafia infiltration (with x = 2,…,14). Note that the post-
dissolution period starts two years after the actual dissolution since the appointed 
commissioners govern the municipality for a period of 12 to 24 months (see above). 
Moreover, we look at bi-yearly periods to maintain sufficient observations for dissolved 
municipalities in each post-dissolution time-period. The left-hand panel of Figure 3 employs 
                                                          
3 Since the observed effects already arise during the commissioners’ term, one alternative explanation might be 
that the commissioners’ actions are linked to the decrease in revenue ability (i.e. a ‘supply’ rather than a 
‘demand’-side effect). Given the importance of local revenues to municipal governments, this appears unlikely 
to be an important factor in our setting. 
4 Artés et al. (2015) likewise illustrate that revealed financial corruption is associated with a reduction of local 
tax revenues (and expenditures) in Spain. 
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all available observations, whereas the right-hand panel of the figure restricts the sample to 
municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced at some point in time.  
_______________________ 
Figure 3 about here 
_______________________ 
The results in Figure 3 indicate a significant U-shaped pattern. The drop in the 
municipalities’ ability of revenue collection after a mafia-corruption scandal starts already in 
the period when the commissioners are governing the municipality (i.e. Under Law 164 in 
Figure 3), and gradually strengthens until six to seven years after the dissolution. Afterwards, 
the ability of revenue collection recovers and even becomes somewhat higher than in 
municipalities not involved in a mafia-corruption scandal by the end of our observation 
period (i.e. 14-15 years after the dissolution). This temporal pattern suggests that the first 
government elected after the mafia-corruption scandal – and in power for the five-year term 
in years two to seven after the dissolution – suffers most strongly from voters’ reaction to 
politicians’ breach of the psychological contract, but that later governments experience a 
redemption effect. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the literature on anti-corruption policies by studying voters’ 
responses to politicians’ publicly exposed ties to criminal organizations in Southern Italian 
municipalities (1985-2013). For identification of causal effects, we exploit Law 164/1991, 
which was approved by the Italian parliament in 1991 to help break ties between local 
politicians and criminal organizations. According to this law, the Italian parliament can 
temporarily dissolve a city council whenever there is the presumption of organized crime’s 
infiltration in the city council, and replace the elected politicians with a team of external 
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technocrats. The exogenous nature of the decision to dissolve a local city council (i.e. both 
the verdict and the timing are fully determined at the national level) and the variation over 
time and space in the application of this law provides a unique opportunity to compare the 
electoral outcomes of municipalities with and without mafia-related government dissolutions 
before and after such dissolution.  
 
Our main results indicate that in the aftermath of a mafia-related political scandal voters 
reduce their support for local-based parties (which are more likely to be involved in 
corruption) and increase their support for nationally active left-wing parties (which are less 
likely to be involved in such scandals). This indicates that – in line with theories of 
retrospective voting (Persson and Tabellini 2002; Besley 2006) – voters use elections to 
remove low-quality candidates from political power. Moreover, the accountability 
mechanisms at work appear very precise in the sense that voters can seemingly target their 
retribution to politicians and parties directly linked to the scandal (rather than punish all 
politicians). A similarly ‘targeted’ response is also observed with respect to voter turnout. 
Indeed, following the dissolution of a city council for organized crime infiltration, we find 
evidence of a significant decrease in voter turnout at local elections, but a much weaker 
response in turnout rates for national elections. While such a decline in turnout is consistent 
with voters’ dissatisfaction translating into increased electoral abstention (Peters and Welch 
1980; Caillier 2010; Bauhr and Grimes 2013; Chong et al. 2015), voters again seem able to 
target their discontent toward the local political class directly involved in the corruption 
scandal. 
 
Finally, we provide evidence that the apparent breach in trust in the local political principal-
agent relationship has effects also beyond the electoral arena. In fact, significant detrimental 
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effects can likewise be observed with respect to citizens’ willingness to contribute to the 
financing of local public goods. Local fiscal revenues represent an important source of 
income for Italian municipalities, which is directly managed by the city council, and our 
results suggest that voters mete out punishment for exposed corruption via their tax payments 
– in line with predictions from social exchange theory (Blau 1964; Akerlof 1982; Frey 1993a, 
b).   
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Table 1: Effect of public exposure of ties to organized crime on voter turnout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
  
Panel I: Turnout in municipal elections (2000-2013) 
First election after dissolution -0.038 *** -0.039 *** -0.037 *** -0.038 *** -0.028 ** -0.029 *** 
 (-3.25) (-3.49) (-3.20) (-3.25) (-2.45) (-2.61) 
Later elections after dissolution  -0.031 ***  -0.026 **  -0.012 
  (-2.98)  (-2.44)  (-0.71) 
R2 (within) 0.39 0.40 0.49 0.50 0.43 0.43 
N 3,053 3,087 3,053 3,087 376 410 
  
Panel II: Turnout in national elections (1987-2008) 
First election after dissolution -0.016 *** -0.013 ** -0.013 ** -0.011 * -0.014 ** -0.008 
 (-2.57) (-2.06) (-2.45) (-1.92) (-2.19) (-1.12) 
Later elections after dissolution  -0.018 ***  -0.015 **  -0.002 
  (-2.72)  (-2.36)  (-0.28) 
R2 (within) 0.32 0.31 0.44 0.44 0.58 0.50 
N 9,182 9,471 9,182 9,471 874 1,163 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Province-Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-differences regression analysis using voter turnout as dependent variable. Panel I focuses on 
turnout in local elections, while panel II evaluates turnout in national elections. First election after dissolution is an indicator variable equal to one 
for municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced in the first election after its enforcement. Later elections after dissolution is an indicator 
variable equal to one in municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced in all elections subsequent to the first election after its enforcement. The 
slight difference in the number of observations in columns (1), (3) and (5) relative to columns (2), (4) and (6) derives from the exclusion of later-
election observations from the sample in the former. Columns (1) to (4) employ all available observations, whereas columns (5) and (6) restrict the 
sample to municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced at some point in time. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the municipality 
level in brackets. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table 2: Effect of public exposure of ties to organized crime on the incumbent (1985-2011) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
First election after dissolution -0.143 *** -0.147 *** -0.189 *** -0.186 *** -0.119 -0.043 
 (-2.66) (-2.77) (-3.18) (-3.13) (-0.99) (-0.45) 
Later elections after dissolution  -0.128 **  -0.156 ***  -0.080 
  (-2.49)  (-2.87)  (-0.72) 
R2 (within) 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.26 0.57 0.52 
N 6,877 7,018 6,877 7,018 585 726 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Province-Year FE NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-differences regression analysis using as dependent variable an indicator variable equal to one if 
the incumbent party wins the local election. First election after dissolution is an indicator variable equal to one for municipalities where Law 
164/1991 is enforced in the first election after its enforcement. Later elections after dissolution is an indicator variable equal to one in 
municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced in all elections subsequent to the first election after its enforcement. The slight difference in the 
number of observations in columns (1), (3) and (5) relative to columns (2), (4) and (6) derives from the exclusion of later-election observations 
from the sample in the former. Columns (1) to (4) employ all available observations, whereas columns (5) and (6) restrict the sample to 
municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced at some point in time. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level in 
brackets. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: Effect of public exposure of ties to organized crime on party preferences (1985-2011) 
 Local 
Party 
Left Party Right Party Centrist 
Party 
 
  
Panel I: Short-term effect 
First election after dissolution -0.196 *** 0.186 *** 0.086 * 0.027 
 (-3.91) (3.45) (1.94) (0.59) 
R2 (within) 0.49 0.21 0.23 0.36 
N 6,877 6,877 6,877 6,877 
  
Panel II: Long-term effect 
First election after dissolution -0.187 *** 0.190 *** 0.081 * 0.022 
 (-3.85) (3.53) (1.80) (0.49) 
Later elections after dissolution -0.147 *** 0.138 *** 0.079 * 0.005 
 (-3.08) (2.60) (1.86) (0.11) 
R2 (within) 0.49 0.21 0.22 0.36 
N 7,018 7,018 7,018 7,018 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Province-Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-differences regression analysis using as dependent 
variable an indicator variable reflecting the political colour of the winning party at the municipal (i.e. Local 
Party, Left Party, Right Party and Centre Party). First election after dissolution is an indicator variable 
equal to one for municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced in the first election after its enforcement. 
Later elections after dissolution is an indicator variable equal to one in municipalities where Law 164/1991 
is enforced in all elections subsequent to the first election after its enforcement. Panel I therefore focuses 
on the short-term immediate effects on voting patterns, while panel II evaluates longer-term effects. T-
statistics based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Enforcement of Law 164/1991 and Political Party in Power (1985-2011)  
 (1) (2) 
Local Party 
 
Reference category 
Left Party -0.020 *** -0.019 *** 
 (-3.35) (-3.24) 
Right Party -0.012 -0.013 
 (-1.37) (-1.47) 
Centrist Party -0.010 -0.017 ** 
 (-1.35) (-2.45) 
R2 (within) 0.04 0.21 
N 5,067 5,067 
Municipality FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Province-Year FE NO YES 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-differences regression analysis 
using as dependent variable an indicator variable equal to one in the year before 
the dissolution of the municipal council due to mafia infiltration. The 
independent variables are indicator variables equal to one when a political party 
(i.e. Left Party, Right Party and Centre Party; Local Party is the reference group) 
is in power in a municipality in a given year. T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered at the municipality level in brackets. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Effect of public exposure of ties to organized crime on revenue collection (1993-2012) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Under Law164 -1.033 -1.637 -1.822 -1.923 * 
 (-0.84) (-1.36) (-1.57) (-1.65) 
First election after dissolution -3.278 *** -3.557 *** -3.451 *** -3.153 *** 
 (-2.64) (-3.08) (-2.82) (-2.64) 
Later elections after dissolution  -0.416  -0.070 
  (-0.33)  (-0.05) 
R2 0.56 0.55 0.62 0.61 
N 23,752 24,905 22,318 23,303 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Province-Year FE NO NO YES YES 
Note: The table shows the results from a difference-in-differences regression analysis using as dependent 
variable the ratio between actually collected revenues and the total amount of assessed revenues that a 
municipality should collect within the year. Under Law 164 is an indicator variable equal to one during the 
enforcement of Law 164/1991 when the three appointed commissioned govern the municipality. First 
election after dissolution is an indicator variable equal to one for municipalities where Law 164/1991 is 
enforced in the first election after its enforcement. Later elections after dissolution is an indicator variable 
equal to one in municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced in all elections subsequent to the first 
election after its enforcement. The slight difference in the number of observations in columns (1) and (3) 
relative to columns (2) and (4) derives from the exclusion of later-election observations from the sample in 
the former. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets. * p<0.10; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Figure 1: Municipality councils dissolved for mafia infiltration over time 
  
Note: The figure presents the number of municipality councils dissolved for organized crime infiltration in the 
period 1991-2014 on a yearly basis.  
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Figure 2: Municipality councils dissolved for mafia infiltration across regions 
 
Note: The figure presents the number of municipality councils dissolved for organized crime infiltration in the 
period 1991-2014 across regions.  
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Figure 3: Municipality councils dissolved for mafia infiltration across regions 
 
Note: The figure shows the results from a difference-in-differences regression analysis using as dependent variable the ratio between actually collected 
revenues and the total amount of assessed revenues that a municipality should collect within the year. Under Law 164 reflects the period during the 
enforcement of Law 164/1991 when the three appointed commissioned govern the municipality, whereas D+x reflects the years x and x+1 
subsequent to its enforcement (with x = 2,…,14). All models include a full set of time-province and municipality fixed effects. The left-hand panel 
employs all available observations, whereas the right-hand panel restrict the sample to municipalities where Law 164/1991 is enforced at some point 
in time. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the municipality level indicated at the bottom of the figure. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01. 
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Appendix 1 – Summary Statistics 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Local Elections 
Local Turnout 3861 0.732 0.108 0.117 0.957 
First election after dissolution (dummy) 3861 0.013 0.114 0 1 
Later elections after dissolution (dummy) 3861 0.009 0.093 0 1 
 
National Elections 
National Turnout 11282 0.753 0.102 0.038 1 
First election after dissolution (dummy) 11289 0.011 0.104 0 1 
Later elections after dissolution (dummy) 11289 0.028 0.165 0 1 
 
Party Choice Outcomes 
Incumbent Party Won (dummy) 7018 0.368 0.482 0 1 
Year Before Council Dissolution (dummy) 5670 0.018 0.133 0 1 
First election after dissolution (dummy) 7018 0.015 0.121 0 1 
Later elections after dissolution (dummy) 7018 0.020 0.140 0 1 
Local Party (dummy) 7018 0.346 0.475 0 1 
Left Party (dummy) 7018 0.257 0.437 0 1 
Right Party (dummy) 7018 0.088 0.284 0 1 
Centrist Party (dummy) 7018 0.204 0.403 0 1 
 
Revenue Collection 
Revenue Collection 24905 51.920 18.156 0.303 117.045 
Under Law164 (dummy) 26519 0.009 0.096 0 1 
First election after dissolution (dummy) 26519 0.025 0.156 0 1 
Later elections after dissolution (dummy) 26519 0.046 0.211 0 1 
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